Suppose AI developers succeed in creating advanced non-conscious artificial moral agents—AI systems that can act in sophisticated ways in the moral domain yet lack phenomenal consciousness (i.e., first-personal experience, something “it is like” to be them). Initially, it might seem that we should be indifferent between human moral agents and artificial moral agents in moral decision-making contexts. In this paper, I argue that we have grounds for requiring certain decisions to be made by human moral agents. I outline two asymmetries that arise between human moral agents and artificial moral agents in virtue of artificial moral agents’ lack of phenomenal consciousness: a moral status asymmetry and a valance asymmetry. I then argue that these asymmetries lead to two factors that have bearing on when we should not be indifferent between human moral agents and artificial moral agents: relationships and responsibility. Insofar as the decision context at hand requires genuine relationships and phenomenal aspects of our responsibility practices, we should prefer a human moral agent.