Big tech “exploits” us. This has become a common refrain among critics of digital platforms. It gives voice to a shared sense that technology firms are somehow mistreating people—taking advantage of us, extracting from us—in a way that other data-driven harms, such as surveillance and algorithmic bias, fail to capture. But what does “exploitation” entail, exactly, and how do platforms perpetrate it? What would a theory of digital exploitation add to existing discussions about platform governance?

In the first part of this paper, Daniel Susser draws from the philosophical literature to argue that the language of “exploitation” is used to level two distinct, but related, allegations. One is about “transactional exploitation.” The worry here is that individuals and technology firms negotiate on unfair terms, with firms getting the better end of the bargain. The second allegation is about “structural exploitation.” Grounded in a more radical tradition, worries about structural exploitation take a wider view, focusing not on particular transactions, but on the background economic and political conditions against which every transaction unfolds.

In the second part of the paper, Susser argues that a theory of digital exploitation can help clarify broader currents in technology ethics and policy. For example, underneath debates about how to rein in big tech’s power—whether through new privacy laws, antitrust enforcement, or more radical, abolitionist approaches—are fundamental questions about the possibility of liberal reform vs the need for deeper structural change.